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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of intermediaries (dealers) in online Consumer-to-Consumer 
(C2C) market. Online C2C transactions, such as the Internet auctions on eBay, are one of the 
most successful forms of electronic commerce (e-commerce). It has been suggested by many 
scholars that the Internet or electronic markets will eliminate intermediaries by lowering search 
cost and allowing direct and efficient interactions between sellers and buyers.  However, a close 
examination of the market mechanism indicates that many functions provided by intermediaries 
are indispensable. Specifically, we consider intermediaries’ role in price discovery and trust 
building in electronic markets. Intermediaries provide a buffer for temporary misalignment 
between supply and demand by buying low and selling high, which provides product liquidity to 
buyers and sellers in online markets. Intermediaries also help build trust by engaging in 
transactions with risk-averse buyers and sellers who otherwise will not participate in the market. 
Using a dataset from eBay’s online auctions, we examine empirically these two functions in online 
C2C auction markets. We find that the presence of dealers has a significant impact on market 
liquidity, resulting in more successful trades and higher auction prices. In addition, we find that 
dealers are more likely to engage in transactions with less established sellers. Their presence 
reduces the reputation penalty faced by these players and further facilitates the success of 
auctions. 
Keywords: e-commerce, electronic market, intermediary, dealer, liquidity, online C2C market, 
 Internet  auction 
 
Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed an explosive growth of electronic marketplaces supported by the new Internet-based 
technologies. Electronic marketplaces are consumer-to-consumer (C2C) communities through which multiple 
buyers and sellers exchange information about products and prices, identify and select trading partners, and transact 
using the Internet technologies (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). Prominent examples of such markets include eBay, 
Yahoo!, and Amazon’s online auctions. It was widely believed that the availability of real-time market information, 
reduced search cost, and instant electronic transaction would allow buyers and sellers to bypass traditional 
intermediaries in the market (Bakos 1991; Bakos 1997). Experience over the past years has shown little evidence to 
support such a belief (Choudhury et al. 1998). Just as asserted by Russell Braziel (2001): “Intermediaries are not 
inefficiencies to be wrung out of spot markets by e-commerce. Instead, they are key to the development of efficient, 
electronic transaction processes.”  
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The Web behemoth eBay is by far the most popular and successful C2C electronic market, with more than 100 
million users and $40 billion gross in 2005.1 eBay has long been viewed as a virtual garage sale. While eBay does 
provide a marketplace to millions of users to sell off their unwanted stuff, currently most of the trading volume on 
the site is conducted by actual businesses.2 For instance, the top 5% of eBay’s music sellers are mostly professional 
dealers or retailers, who generate over 50% of the sites’ business.3 eBay was originally founded as an auction site. 
Since the addition of the “Buy it Now” feature which allows the seller to sell at a fixed price, it has attracted a 
growing volume of transactions from dealers and retailers. The growth of eBay shows that, intermediaries (e.g. 
dealers and retailers) not only still exist, but also seem to play an important role in electronic markets. In this paper 
we aim to take the initial step to examine the role of intermediaries (dealers in our context) in C2C electronic 
markets.  
The key function for intermediaries to exist in the first place is to make transactions happen, i.e., provide liquidity in 
the market (Cosimano 1996). For an electronic market, liquidity is about a critical mass of transactions that draws 
buyers and sellers to the market. For the buyers and sellers, liquidity can be defined as the capability to get 
transactions done quickly at a fair price. Specifically, we consider two roles of intermediaries in helping provide 
liquidity in electronic markets: price discovery and trust building. Intermediaries provide buffer for temporary 
misalignment between supply and demand by buying low and selling high, which provides product liquidity to 
buyers and sellers in online markets and increases prices. Intermediaries also help build trust by engaging in 
transactions with risk-averse buyers and sellers who otherwise will not participate in the market. We empirically 
examine these two functions using stamp auction data from eBay. Our preliminary results suggest that the presence 
of dealers has a significant impact on market liquidity, resulting in more successful trades and higher auction prices.  
In addition, we find that dealers are more likely to engage in transactions with less established buyers and sellers.  
Their presence reduces reputation penalty faced by these players and further improves market liquidity. This study 
contributes to both academics and practitioners in understanding the role of dealers in electronic markets.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a brief review of related literature, 
followed by the development of hypotheses. Data are described and preliminary empirical analyses are presented in 
the following two sections. The paper is concluded by discussing the current findings and the agenda for the future 
research. 
Related Literature 
The Role of Intermediaries  
Many issues of the role of intermediaries (dealers and other third parties and institutions) in the economic system 
have long been studied in the economics and finance literature (Cosimano 1996; Diamond 1984; Garman 1976; Ho 
and Stoll 1981; Lizzeri 1999; Winkler 1989). In particular, it has been suggested that intermediaries can make the 
market more liquid by lowering the probability of unsuccessful trade and stabilizing market prices (Cosimano 1996). 
Especially for human intermediaries, extant literature has shown that their knowledge of the market may facilitate 
quicker and more efficient matching of customer orders (Grossman 1992). When information asymmetry is high, the 
repeated interactions between a human intermediary and its customers allows better trust building and better price 
offer (Barclay and Hendershott 2006; Seppi 1990). 
The proliferation of electronic trading systems and electronic markets has appealed to new thoughts about the role of 
intermediaries (Bhargava and Choudhary 2004; Weber 2006). It is predicted that the rise of electronic markets will 
make traditional intermediaries obsolete by matching buyers and sellers directly (Malone et al. 1987; Bakos 1997). 
However, such predictions of the vanishing of intermediaries have seen little anecdotal support. Using data from 
Aircraft parts industry, Choudhury et al. (1998) find that the extent to which brokers are used is not influenced by 
the implementation of an electronic inventory location system. Barclay and Hendershott (2006) test the role of 
human intermediaries in the U.S. Treasury securities market. They find that the market share of trading through 
human intermediaries is significantly higher than that through automated trading systems for less active securities. 
                                                          
1 Daytona Beach News Journal, June 19, 2005 
2 Forrester research report 2005 
3 Music Trades, August, 2004 
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Human intermediaries’ expertise of the market can uncover hidden liquidity and facilitate matching of customer 
orders. 
Online Auction 
As the leading representative of a C2C electronic marketplace, auction sites on the Internet have enjoyed 
tremendous popularity and success, thus promoting a wide series of academic research ranging from auction formats 
(Lucking-Reiley 1999), bidding behavior (Park and Bradlow 2005), to the influence of winner’s curse and last-
minute bidding (Bajari and Hortaçsu 2003; Roth and Ockenfels 2003). For example, Dewan and Hsu (2004) 
examine adverse selection in electronic markets. They find that the stamp auction prices on eBay are significantly 
lower than those in a traditional stamp auction site. Such adverse selection discount is attributed to the higher quality 
uncertainty in the Internet auctions.  
As this paper studies the role of dealers in trust building, it is also related to recent studies investigating trust 
building in online auctions. Extant literature has focused on investigating whether online feedback and reputation 
systems induce trust and lead to higher auction prices. Ba and Pavlou find that sellers’ feedback profile plays a very 
important role in auction price premiums. Melnik and Alm (2002) show that sellers’ reputation has a small positive 
impact on prices in eBay’s coin auctions. Dewan and Hsu (2004) also demonstrate that sellers’ feedback score has 
modest effect on stamp auction prices and probability of sale.  
This paper focuses on examining the role of dealers in online C2C electronic marketplaces. To our knowledge, the 
impact of intermediaries on market structure and efficiency in C2C marketplaces has not been addressed by previous 
literature. This research aims to take the initial step to fill this gap in contributing to the literature in understanding 
the roles of intermediaries in electronic markets. 
Hypotheses 
Extant economics and finance literature suggest that intermediaries can make markets more liquid by increasing the 
probability of successful trade and stabilizing market price (Cosimano 1996; Grossman 1992). Such a function of 
dealers is still indispensable in electronic marketplaces. Dealers are often professionals with substantial product 
knowledge. Especially for collectible and private value items such as stamps, coins, antiques, and works of art, 
dealers have the expertise of identifying product value. Dealers are also active participants of the C2C marketplaces, 
gaining unique insights into market dynamics. Dealers’ knowledge of products and the market enables them to be 
more informed of the intrinsic value of auctioned items in the marketplace and to match unsynchronized supply and 
demand over time. Accordingly, the presence of dealers increases the probability of trade. In addition, dealers also 
can be more resilient to changes in transaction volume in the market given their large inventory. They can choose to 
strategically enter or exit the market as opposed to other occasional buyers and sellers, thus providing liquidity of 
the product. Furthermore, existence of dealers also provides product quality and price references for other buyers 
and sellers, which facilitate price discovery in the marketplace, resulting in higher market prices. This gives rise to 
the following hypotheses: 
H1a: The presence of dealers in electronic markets increases the probability of trade in the market. 
H1b: The presence of dealers in electronic markets increases market prices. 
Electronic marketplaces are also susceptible to information asymmetry between buyers and sellers (Pavlou and 
Gefen 2004). First, buyers face higher uncertainty of product quality in online markets without direct observations 
than in conventional brick and mortar stores. Second, participants in electronic markets are often remote buyers and 
sellers who have little or no prior interactions. Third, electronic transactions expose participants to an even greater 
risk with the lack of enforceable regulatory policies. Building trust has therefore become a crucial factor in 
influencing trading in electronic marketplaces (Ba and Pavlou 2002). Existing literature has addressed the roles of 
third parties, institutions, and feedback and reputation systems in evaluating sellers’ credentials and improving trust 
building (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). Consequently, new entrants would face the barrier of establishing reputation in 
the market before they can be fully recognized.4 The presence of dealers can reduce such reputation penalty in 
                                                          
4 Many listings on eBay are specified to be only sold to buyers with more than 25 feedback scores.  
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dealing with less established buyers and sellers. Dealers often have established reputation and can bear more risks in 
buying and selling. As a result, they can gain price premium in online marketplaces by selling to risk-averse buyers. 
They are also more willing to take the risk of purchasing from less established sellers. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:  
H2a: Sellers with lower feedback scores are more likely to obtain higher price premium from dealers as buyers.  
H2b: Dealers’ items are more likely to generate higher price premium from buyers with lower feedback scores.  
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The Stamp Auction Data 
Millions of items are listed on eBay on any given day, which are organized into thousands of categories and 
subcategories. In this paper, we choose the stamp auctions on the eBay US site as our research context for four 
reasons. First, stamps are one major category in online auction sites such as eBay where there are more than 100,000 
listings every day. Second, stamps are widely recognized as common value items that require specialty knowledge 
to evaluate. Third, the stamp auction market traditionally has the dominant feature of having quality variation in the 
items, which imposes risks in electronic markets. Finally, the retail value of stamps can be obtained from various 
stamp catalogs. One of the most widely referenced stamp catalogues is the Scott Standard Postage Stamp Catalogue 
(SCC). SCC is updated and published annually according to the survey of stamps dealers worldwide. In this study 
we use 2006 Scott Value as a proxy for the book value of stamps (Dewan and Hsu 2004).  
We collected data from one of the eBay’s stamp auction subcategories: “1941-Now: Unused US Stamps”, which has 
a consistently large number of listings (more than 2000 listings on each day). Our data collection is conducted 
monthly to get detailed item information, bidding, and transaction data for all the ended listings in the past month. 
The completeness of history makes it possible to compile a data set with great wealth of information. We started our 
data collection in February 2006 and each month we collected more than 6000 listings. For each item, more than 80 
variables are collected for listing details, bidding history, and transaction information. Table 1 provides the 
description of some key variables of our data.   
For the purpose of our research, it is important to identify the dealers in the market. We define the following two 
types of agents as dealers. The first type is the traditional stamp dealers who usually hold bulky inventory and sell 
large number of stamps. The second type is individuals who take the opportunity of buying low and selling high to 
make profits. They are usually stamp collectors themselves who have expertise on stamp assessment. Both types of 
dealers can be readily identified through their seller level, descriptions and trading history.5   
Table 1. Variable Description 
Variable  Description 
Auct_Len Describes the number of days the seller wants the listing to be active 
Bid_Count Number of bids placed against the item. 
Buyer_FbScore The aggregate feedback score for the buyer 
Dealer If true, the seller or buyer is a typical dealer in the market 
End_Price Transaction price of the item 
EndPrice/Value Ratio of the transaction price and the Scott Value 
Seller_FbScore The aggregate feedback score for the seller 
Seller_Level The seller's eBay PowerSeller tier  
Start_Price Value of start price specified by the seller 
StartPrice/Value Ratio of the start price and the Scott Value 
                                                          
5 Many dealers even clearly identify themselves as “stamp dealer” on their listing pages and choose a user name 
attached with “stamp”. 
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Descriptive Statistics  
To generate some initial insights for our research questions, we analyze our data of listings ended between February 
20 and March 10, 2006. To control for the cross-product heterogeneity and ensure the accuracy of evaluation, our 
analysis is restricted to the single-item auction listings for commemorative stamp sets. As reported in Table 2, the 
average book value of stamps is $16.82, ranging from $0.2 to $750, reflecting the wide dispersion of stamp book 
values. The average normalized (price to value ratio) start price is 0.78 with a fluctuation from 0.00004 to 31.78, 
indicating the variation of sellers’ expertise on stamp values. While some sellers may set a very low start price with 
the strategic consideration of attracting more buyers, there is no rational justification for setting a start price much 
higher than the book value. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Auct_Len 3015 6.74 1.04 1.00 10.00 
Scott_Value 3015 16.82 36.48 0.20 750.00 
StartPrice/Value 3015 0.78 0.93 0.00004 31.58 
Seller_FbScore 3015 3921.50 5895.03 0.00 21485.00 
Seller_Level 3015 2.11 1.18 1.00 7.00 
Dealer_Seller_Level 1975 3.48 1.20 2.00 7.00 
% Seller_Dealer 1975 (65.51%)    
% Sold 1681 (55.75%)       
 
Sellers’ feedback scores vary from 0 to 21485 with an average around 4000, indicating that the market 
accommodates both novices and veterans.6 To further differentiate sellers, eBay provides a “PowerSeller” ranking 
system with tiers from Bronze to Titanium. Qualified sellers must sustain a consistently high volume of monthly 
sales and a high level of total Feedback.7 We assign a numeric value to the descriptive ranking, so that None equals 
to 1 and Titanium equals to 7. In Table 2, we see that the average seller level is around 2, suggesting that there are 
many inexperienced sellers in the market. Table 2 also shows that there are about 65% listings are from dealers and 
a little more than half (55.75%) items are successfully sold.  
Table 3 demonstrates the summary statistics for sold items. The mean of the normalized start price is 0.61 which is 
lower than the total sample (0.78). The normalized end price ranges from 0.02 to 4.14 with a mean of 0.84. This 
suggests that on average the end price is lower than the book value. However, some listings also can be sold at a 
price 3-4 times higher than their book value. Such a market well exhibits the opportunity of generating profits of 
buying low and selling high. Table 3 also tells us that around 64% sold items are from dealers, but only about 2% 
buyers are dealers. It is also worth noting that the average buyer feedback score (294.42) is much lower than sellers’ 
(3533.82). The buyers’ seller level is also fairly low with a mean of 1.08 and maximum of only 4, suggesting that 
most buyers in the market are relatively inexperienced.   
Our data can be further classified into two categories: the commemorative year set (CYS) and the souvenir sheet set 
(SSS). Both categories are very popular in the stamp market with high collection values. The values of SSS are 
easily identified even for stamp novices, but to evaluate different year sets (the complete set of commemorative 
stamps in a specific year) requires considerable effort and expertise. As shown in Table 4, the percentage of dealers 
in the category of CYS (83.67%) is higher than that in SSS (50.45%). In addition, the average seller feedback score 
is much higher in CYS (5148.01) than that in SSS (2905.48), indicating that there are much more experienced sellers 
in CYS. Comparing these two categories allows us to identify the impact of dealers in different markets. 
 
                                                          
6 Feedback score is an aggregation of feedbacks from both buyers and sellers. 
7 PowerSeller must maintain a 98% or better positive rating by other eBay users. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Sold Items 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Auct_Len 1681 6.79 0.94 1.00 10.00 
Bid_Count 1681 3.17 3.39 1.00 28.00 
StartPrice/Value 1681 0.61 0.51 0.00004 3.93 
EndPrice/Value 1681 0.84 0.55 0.02 4.14 
Seller_FbScore 1681 3533.82 5779.58 0.00 21485.00 
Buyer_FbScore 1681 284.42 573.09 0.00 4053.00 
Buyer_Seller_Level 1681 1.08 0.39 1.00 4.00 
% Seller_Dealer 1077 (64.07%)         
% Buyer_Dealer 28 (1.67%)     
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for CYS and SSS 
  Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EndPrice/Value  740 1.01 0.61 0.04 4.14 
StartPrice/Value 1366 0.94 0.79 0.005 11.86 
Seller_FbScore 1366 5148.01 5781.21 3.00 21480.00 
% Dealer 83.67%     
CYS 
% Sold 54.17%        
EndPrice/Value 941 0.71 0.45 0.02 3.93 
StartPrice/Value 1649 0.65 1.01 0.000004 31.58 
Seller_FbScore 1649 2905.48 5795.99 0.10 21485.00 
% Dealer 50.45%     
SSS 
% Sold 57.06%        
 
Empirical Analyses 
In order to test the impact of dealers on the success rate of trade, we run a logistic regression with the probability of 
sale as the dependent variable. The key independent variables are a binary specification indicating whether the item 
was listed by a dealer, and the interaction term between dealer and their feedback scores. Drawing from previous 
empirical auction literature (e.g. Bajari and Hortaçsu 2003; Dewan and Hsu 2004), we also include other variables 
that are likely to influence the possibility of sale. As evidenced in Table 5, dealers’ listings enjoy a significantly 
higher probability of sale after controlling for the reputation effect. In addition, the results show that for a dealer, the 
success rate of sale no longer depends on his feedback score. This finding is demonstrated by adding the coefficients 
of feedback score and the interaction term (0.13 + -0.19 = -0.06), which is not statistically significant. Therefore, the 
presence of dealer increases the probability of sale in the market, regardless of their feedback scores. The logistic 
regression results support our hypothesis (H1a) that the presence of dealers provides liquidity in the market by 
increasing the probability of trade. 
We also compare the two markets of CYS and SSS in light of whether dealers play a role in facilitating trade. As 
shown in Table 6, dealers significantly increase the success rate of sale only in CYS, but not in SSS. Given that the 
percentage of sold listings in CYS (54.17) and SSS (57.06) are very similar, this result suggests that dealers’ 
influences are more pronounced in the market that requires expertise knowledge of the product with greater 
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. 
To test the influence of dealers on the market price (H1b) and their interactions with buyers and dealers (H2a and 
H2b), we run a regression using the normalized end price as the dependent variable. The key independent variables 
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are dummy variables indicating whether the seller or the buyer is a dealer, dummy variables indicating whether 
sellers or buyers have low or high feedback scores,8 and their interactions. We also add other control variables 
including auction length, the normalized start price, number of bids, and the indication of whether the auction ends 
during the weekend. Table 7 shows the regression results. We can see that the participation of dealers as either a 
seller or a buyer increases the normalized end price. This validates our hypothesis of dealers’ role of buying low and 
selling high in the market, providing liquidity and leading to higher market prices.  
 
Table 5. Logistic Regression Result 
Variable Parameter Estimate 
Seller_Dealer 1.40***(0.37) 
log (Seller_FbScore) 0.13***(0.04) 
Seller_Dealer*log(Seller_FbScore) -0.19***(0.06) 
log (Auction_Len) 0.72***(0.21) 
log (StartPrice/Value) -0.88*** (0.06) 
Weekend 0.15*(0.08) 
Constant -2.33 (0.48) 
    
Number of Observations  3015 
Log-Likelyhood   -1874.14 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the item has been sold.                  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 6. Logistic Regression Result 
Variable Year_Set Sheet_Set 
 Parameter Estimate 
Seller_Dealer 5.24*** (0.75) 0.15 (0.46) 
log (Seller_FbScore) 0.56*** (0.11) 0.03 (0.05) 
Seller _Dealer*log (Seller_FbScore) -0.80*** (0.13) -0.02 (0.07) 
log (Auction_Len) 1.89*** (0.34) -0.15 (0.31) 
log (StartPrice/Value) -0.86*** (0.09) -0.96*** (0.08) 
Weekend 0.19 (0.12) 0.16 (0.11) 
Constant -6.92 (0.88) -0.36 (0.67) 
       
Number of Observations  1366   1649 
Log-Likelyhood   -817.14   -1026.20 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the item has been sold.  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
H2a is also supported in the results that the influence on price by dealers is more pronounced for sellers with lower 
feedback scores (the interaction term of Buyer_Dealer and Seller_FbScore_d is negative and significant). However, 
H2b is not supported in the regression results. This is due to the fact that the interaction term of Seller_Dealer and 
Buyer_FbScore_d captures two conflicting effects. On the one hand, reputation effect indicates that buyers with 
lower feedback scores (less experienced buyers) are willing to pay more to buy from a dealer, leading to a negative 
interaction effect. On the other hand, dealers usually price auction items at fairer prices, so less experienced buyers 
                                                          
8 The binary user feedback score is determined by the median of the sample feedback score. For example, for data 
with buyer feedback score greater the sample median, the dummy variable Buyer_FbScore_d equals to 1, otherwise 
equals to 0.  
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are less likely to be ripped off by buying from a dealer, leading to a positive interaction effect. The interaction 
between dealers and less experienced buyers warrant further investigation in the extended research. Overall, our 
findings suggest that dealers are more likely to engage in transactions with less established sellers. Such a result 
provides initial support for our hypothesis that dealers can bear more risk and help trust building among 
inexperienced players in the market, thus reducing the reputation penalty faced by those less established buyers and 
sellers.   
 
Table 7. Regression Result for Normalized End Price 
Variable Parameter Estimate 
Seller_Dealer 0.15*** (0.03) 
Buyer_Dealer 0.36*** (0.11) 
Seller_FbScore_d 0.16*** (0.03) 
Buyer_FbScore_d -0.07* (0.03) 
Seller_Dealer*Buyer_FbScore_d 0.08* (0.04) 
Buyer_Dealer*Seller_FbScore_d -0.59*** (0.17) 
log (Auction_Len) 0.05 (0.06) 
log (StartPrice/Value) 0.43*** (0.01) 
log (Bid_Count) 0.39*** (0.02) 
Weekend 0.005 (0.02) 
Constant -0.53 (0.12) 
     
Number of Observations  1681 
Adj. R Sq   0.48 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
Our preliminary empirical analyses of the stamp auction data indicate that the presence of dealers help provide 
liquidity in electronic markets. Our data show that over 50% of the volume is contributed by dealers. We find that 
the presence of dealers improves the probability of sale especially for the stamp category that requires more 
knowledge and expertise. Moreover, the initial analyses indicate that dealers are more likely to engage in 
transactions with less experienced sellers, which further facilitate the liquidity. Even though more conclusive 
insights require larger and more comprehensive data analysis, our current results lay the foundation of the future 
development of this research. We will next proceed to full-scale data analysis and more comprehensive empirical 
testing for our hypotheses. In particular, our complete paper will investigate more extensively the “trust building” 
between dealers and users in the online auction market. In our complete paper, we will not only analyze the auction 
data, but also compare and contrast them with the fixed price items. The analysis will also be extended to longer 
time periods to capture the dynamics of the impact of dealers in the market. In addition, our sample will be 
segmented in detailed level based on the book value. Finally, we will include more categories of items in our 
analysis to generate a deeper understanding of the roles of dealers in different markets.   
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